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The Price of Security: On the Causality and Impact 
of Lay-off Risks on Wages 
Abstract 
 
We examine the impact of lay-off risks on wages. Portfolio as well as search theoretic 
modelling predicts higher exogenous lay-off risks to go along with higher wages. But, 
an impact of wages on lay-off risks (e.g., endogenous job destruction) is also plausible. 
Using the German BA Employment Panel (2008), we estimate a wage equation with 
exogenous lay-off risks for the most important industries in West Germany. We address 
the mutual causality by controlling for endogeneity via an instrumental variable 
approach. Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to the high skilled to avoid a high 
impact on tariff commitment. Our findings suggest the presence of risk premiums in 
three of five industries. The level of impact and its significance depends on the industry 
and on the gender of the employee. 
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1  Motivation 
“Life can never give security, it can only promise opportunity.”
1 Security is a basic need of 
the majority of people. This statement is also true for workplace security. Because risk is part 
of a dynamic economy, the market creates compensating mechanisms when a lack of security 
is  present.  Wages  often  serve  as  a  compensation  for  risk  in  the  labour  market.  This 
competition allows for the opportunity to trade between risk and money. 
While negotiating wages, risk factors are important issues for both employers and employees. 
Therefore,  the  risks  are  twofold:  health  risk  and  lay-off  risk.  Numerous  studies  have 
investigated the impact of health risks on wages [e.g., Viscusi (1978)]. Literature of the last 
three  decades  has  examined  the  tradeoff  between  lay-off  risks  and  wages  [Abowd  and 
Ashenfelter  (1981),  Villanueva  (2007)].  In  this  paper,  we  contribute  to  the  literature  by 
identifying the impact of the risk of lay-offs on wages. We extend the existing literature by 
analysing risk premiums due to lay-off risk for regular employment in the five most important 
private sector industries in West Germany (construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail 
trade, real estate, renting and business activities and transport, storage and communication). 
West  Germany  serves  as  a  good  example  of  a  Central  European  labour  market.  Its 
institutional framework and the industrial specific shares of employment [Eurostat (2011)] 
correspond with the European average.
2 
Using  the  BA-Employment  Panel  (2008),  this  is  the  first  study  to  focus  on  high  skilled 
employees. We do so for two reasons. First, the scarcity of high skilled workers strengthens 
their  negotiation  position.  Their  stronger  negotiation  position  eases  the  pricing  of  risk. 
Second, the tariff commitment of medium- and low-skilled employees is probably higher. 
                                                           
1 Chinese proverb. 
2 Furthermore the unemployment rates shows similar cyclicality and therefore comparable fluctuations in the lay-
off risk. 3 
 
Thus, exogenous wage setting may induce lay-offs. To avoid this problem of mutual causality 
(endogeneity),  we  concentrate  our  analysis  on  the  high  skilled  employee.  However,  the 
endogeneity  cannot  be  totally  excluded  by  focusing  only  on  the  high  skilled  employees. 
Therefore, we address this problem and control for econometric endogeneity in detail. 
To identify the lay-off risk premiums, we estimate wage equations for high skilled male and 
female  employees  for  the  five  main  industries.  Our  method  is  in  line  with  the  empirical 
literature that uses exogenous measure of lay-off risk [e.g., Moretti (2000)]. In contrast to the 
literature that uses wage distribution measures as a proxy for the lay-off risks [e.g., Hartog et 
al.  (2003)],  we  calculate  gender  and  industry  specific  drop-out  rates  because  those  rates 
represent the pure risk of losing a job. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we provide a review of the 
related  literature.  Section  3  describes  our  dataset.  Section  4  presents  the  econometric 
specifications.  Our  findings  are  presented  in  Section  5,  and  in  Section  6,  we  discuss  the 
problem of endogeneity and mutual causality in detail. In Section 7, we conclude and discuss 
our findings. 
 
2  Literature 
The relationship between (lay-off) risk and wage can be shown by different types of economic 
models. Basically, it is possible to adapt a portfolio model to the labour market [e.g., Abowd 
and  Ashenfelter  (1981)]  whereby  a  worker  is  faced  with  two  comparable  job  offers  with 
different lay-off risks. The lay-off risk is exogenous for the worker. In equilibrium, workers 
want the same expected incomes in both the risk and the nonrisk job. This consideration 
induces workers to want higher wages for jobs with higher risks. The same is true for risk 
change over time. If a worker is working continuously in the same job and only the lay-off 4 
 
risks change exogenously, then he adjusts his expected income. If the lay-off risk increases, 
the wage increases as well. 
The result of a positive impact of the lay-off risk on wages can also be derived from search-
theoretic  models  [e.g.,  Burdett  and  Mortensen  (1998)].
3  The  workers’  calculus,  which  is 
similar to the portfolio model, is extended by the firm’s calculus. Both models show that in 
equilibrium the (reservation) wage depends, among other factors, on the lay-off risk. The 
derivation of the (reservation) wage with respect to the lay-off risk is positive.
4 
The empirical literature of earning differentials focuses on the question of whether there are 
wage  premiums  for  workplace  disadvantages.  Only  a  portion  of  the  literature  focuses  on 
unemployment  risk.  There  are  two  methods  to  calculate  the  wage  premiums  for 
unemployment risk. A first approach uses the variance of wages as proxy for the earning risk. 
A  higher  variance  of  wages  is  considered  a  higher  income  risk.  For  example,  Li  (1986), 
McGoldrick  (1995)  and  Hartog  et  al.  (2003)  use  this  method  and  find  a  positive  wage 
compensation for higher risks.
5 
The  second  method  is  to  estimate  a  wage  equation  with  the  unemployment  risk  as  an 
exogenous variable. The majority of empirical studies use this method to determine the effect 
of  higher  unemployment  risks  on  wages.  In  two  studies  from  the  U.S.,  Abowd  and 
Ashenfelter (1981, 1984) find a negative effect of unemployment (risk) on wages. Two recent 
examples are Moretti (2000) and Villanueva (2007). Moretti (2000) uses panel data to identify 
the  impact  of  individual  unemployment  risks,  as  well  as  general  unemployment  risks,  on 
                                                           
3 A good and widespread description is given by Rodgerson et al. (2005). The extension of losing a job was 
introduced by Burdett and Mortensen (1980) and Wright (1987). 
4 The sign of the derivation depends on the matching probabilities (on-the-job and out-of-unemployment) as well 
as the proportion of the marginal productivity of a worker and the unemployment benefit. Our dataset indicates a 
positive sign. 
5 Moore (1995) finds a general negative impact of unemployment risk on wages, but he focus on union 
membership. Considering union membership, he finds a positive impact. 5 
 
wages.  He  compares  permanent  workers  with  seasonal  workers  and  finds  a  positive  risk 
premium for the seasonal worker. Villanueva (2007) uses the German Socioeconomic Panel 
to investigate risk premiums for voluntary job changes. Among other factors, he estimates the 
compensating effect of increased job insecurity; however, he finds little evidence for this 
effect. Using a unique dataset with information on income expectations, Guiso et al. (2002) 
analyse  the  link  between  future  income  and  unemployment  risks  in  Italy.  They  use  both 
methods and note that “variations in the perceived probability of unemployment explain a 
large part of differences in income prospects” [see Guiso el. al. (2002) p. 251]. We follow the 
second approach and also estimate a wage equation with exogenous lay-off risks. 
 
3  The Dataset 
We use the German BA-Employment-Panel (2008) to identify risk premiums. This dataset is 
a two-percent sample of all socially secured employees in Germany. The BA-Employment-
Panel (2008) contains quarterly information from 1998 to 2007. We use the BA-Employment 
Panel (2008) from the year 2000 because unemployment information is not available until 
then. In our analysis, we focus on full-time employees; apprentices and part-time employees 
are not considered. We divide the dataset into East and West Germany. The segmentation is 
based on the job location, and we focus on those employees who have worked continuously in 
West Germany. We exclude East Germany because it is in the process of structural transition. 
The dataset provides comprehensive information on individual characteristics (e.g., sex, age, 
wage, employment status, education, type of employment,) as well as on firms’ characteristics 
(e.g., size, rate of old and young employees, industry). A disadvantage of our dataset is that 
the wages are truncated at the maximum as contributions to the social insurance have to be 
paid.  All  higher  income  information  is  optional.  Higher  incomes  are,  for  the  most  part, 6 
 
reported as the maximum at contributions to the social insurance have to be paid. Therefore, 
changes in wages beyond this maximum are not observable. Thus, we truncate the dataset one 
euro below the maximum level at which contribution to the social insurance must be paid.
6 
For low wages, we use 650 euro per month as a minimum cut-off level because 650 euro is 
the average benefit level for the long-term unemployed [Federal Statistical Office Germany 
(2010)]. All wages below the 650 euro cut-off are most likely supported by top-up benefits. 
Finally,  we  build  a  balanced  panel,  that  is,  we  include  all  persons  who  were  observed 
continuously throughout all 32 quarters. Table 1 presents a summary of our dataset. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Conditioned Dataset (2000-2007) 
  West Germany 
Total Employees  170 700 
Unemployment Quarters  2.69% 
Male  73.04% 
High Skilled  10.64% 
Construction Industry  6.48% 
Manufacturing Industry  35.73% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade  14.91% 
Real estate, Renting and Business Activities  8.21% 
Transport, Storage and Communication  5.56% 
Small Firm (<50 Employees)  31.59% 
Medium Firm  24.18% 
Large Firm (>200 Employees)  44.23% 
Source: BA-Employment Panel (2008), authors’ calculations. 
We extend the dataset with additional information. We calculate the industrial and gender- 
specific share of workers who became unemployed (seasonal adjusted and detrended).
7 The 
resulting variable is added as a drop-out-rate to proxy the lay-off risk. Moreover, we add the 
job tenure of each worker in the sample, and we calculate the real wages from the given 
                                                           
6 The truncation affects only 1.5% to 3% of all individuals, depending on the industry. 
7 We calculate the moving average to seasonally adjust the data. Furthermore, we use a standard Hodrick-
Prescott-Filter with  =1600 to detrend quarterly data. 7 
 
nominal values using price level data from the Federal Statistical Office Germany (2011). The 
classification  of  industries  follows  the  European  national  account  system  [see  Federal 
Statistical Office Germany (2007)]. 
The extended BA-Employment Panel (2008) allows a primer descriptive illustration of the 
assumed relation between lay-off risk (drop-out-rate) and wages. We scatter the quarterly 
drop-out-rates  with  the  corresponding  quarterly  average  wages  for  high  skilled  male  and 
female  workers.  Figure  1  is  a  representation  of  the  scatter  plot  for  high  skilled  male 
employees in the real estate, renting and business activities industry. 
Figure 1: Scatter Plot of the Drop-Out-Rate and Wages for High Skilled Male Employees in the Real 
Estate, Renting and Business Activities Industry 
 
Source: BA-Employment Panel (2008), authors’ calculations. 
Figure 1 suggests a positive correlation between lay-off risks and wages. This descriptive 
illustration may give a first impression of a possible relation. Detailed econometric analyses 
are needed to derive reliable statements about the connectedness of lay-off risk and wages. In 































Industrial and Gender Specific Drop-Out-Rate8 
 
4  The Empirical Model 
The related literature suggests the following empirical model to estimate the impact of lay-off 
risk on wages: 
                                   .         
The individual’s     real wage     in period   is explained by a constant, the industry specific 
    lay-off risk     in period     1, control variables and an error term. As control variables, 
we use age, professional status, firm-size, firm’s age structure, job tenure as well as year-and 
quarter-dummy  variables.  The  quarter-dummy  variables  capture  seasonal  effects,  and  the 
year-dummy variables capture the general economic development. 
To  provide  evidence  for  the  assumption  that  risks  are  compensated  by  higher  wages,  we 
estimate our empirical model with a focus on  , the industrial and gender specific lay-off 
risk.
8 We calculate the lay-off risk as industrial and gender specific drop-out-rates. The drop-
out-rates  are  the  shares  of  all  employees  in  a  period  and  industry  who  switch  to 
unemployment.  For  the  estimation,  we  use  the  one  period  lagged  drop-out-rates.  Our 
estimation presents the calculus of rational individuals, which use all available information. In 
period  , the individual earns a wage that is based on the expected income with respect to the 
lay-off risk of period     1. The expected incomes are based on information that is available 
up to the current period.  
                                                           
8 Another option is to calculate the (individual) lay-off risk (e.g., logit or probit regressions). In the first stage, 
one has to estimate the lay-off risk using variables that are also important for the wage equation (e.g., sex, origin, 
experience and skill). In the second stage, those variables have to be excluded from the wage equation. Borjas 
and Sueyoshi (1994) show that such a two-stage estimator for probit models is unbiased if the exogenous 
variables of both stages are independent from one another. Because of the loss of variables for the second stage, 
the wage estimation loses quality. 9 
 
The drop-out-rates are a proxy for the individual unemployment risk. The advantage is that 
they are exogenous for each individual. The average drop-out-rates in a certain industry affect 
the  individual  wage  but  not  vice  versa.  The  individual  takes  into  account  the  industrial 
specific lay-off risk (drop-out-rate), but the individual wage does not affect this drop-out-rate. 
We  restrict  our  analysis  to  high  skilled  employees  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  individual 
negotiating  power  increases  with  skill  level.  High  skilled  individuals  are  scarce,  and  this 
scarcity strengthens their bargaining position. In contrast to medium- and low-skilled workers, 
high skilled individuals are able to achieve risk compensating premiums more easily because 
their out-side option (to change firms or industries) is more plausible. The second reason is 
the fact that wages of low- and medium-skilled workers are often determined by collective 
bargaining. Hence, they are often not able to negotiate individual wages because of their risk. 
Unfortunately, the skill specific union bargaining is still an open field of empirical economic 
research.  
We  estimate  the  empirical  wage  equation  for  different  industries  to  get  clear  industrially 
specific  evidence.
9  Hence,  we  focus  on  the  time  variation  of  the  wages,  which  can  be 
explained by the variation of the lay-off risks in different industries. The industrial specific 
estimation derives reliable results despite the exclusion of inter-industrial mobility of worker. 
Two reasons support our considerations. First, the existence of the out-side option for high 
skilled workers is sufficient. Second, we observe only a very small fraction of inter-industrial 
job changes in our dataset. 
If separate industries are analysed, the problem of self-selection of workers may be present. 
This  issue  is,  for  example,  addressed  by  Garen  (1987)  who  shows  serious  problems  by 
selecting  a useful sample because of the possibility of self-selection. Jacobs et al. (2009) 
                                                           
9 An estimation for the whole economy would be inefficient because the dummy-variables for different 
industries are correlated with the industrial specific drop-out-rates in each period. Therefore, the standard errors 
of the estimators increase. 10 
 
suggest that empirical estimations of risk premiums may be biased through self-selection and 
that the impact of individual risk may be underestimated, but the direction of the impact 
between risks and wages do not change. 
We only take into account industries of the private sector with more than 5% of all fulltime 
employees in our dataset.
10 These industries cover approximately 86% of all employees in the 
private sector in our sample. To identify the effect of the lay-off risk, we applied random 
effect as well as fixed effect panel estimations. Collinearity is a common problem in OLS-
regression,  causing  possible  inefficiency  and  the  insignificance  of  important  variables. 
Testing for pair wise correlations suggests that collinearity of the exogenous variables is not 
present.  For the majority  of variables, we do not find strong  correlations. We use  robust 
random (OLS-RE) and fixed effect estimation methods (OLS-FE) to avoid heteroscedasticity. 
To decide whether to use random effect or fixed effect regression, we run a Hausman-test. 
The Hausman-test suggests fixed effect estimation. Therefore, we run gender specific, fixed 
effect regressions in every industry. In an aggregated estimation, we would otherwise lose 
time invariant information such as gender and skill. 
Because we focus our analyses on the variation over time, we must also address the possible 
problem of auto-correlated error terms. Although auto-correlated error terms do not bias the 
estimators, they change the significance by increasing the standard deviation. Using the test 
method  proposed  by  Wooldridge  (2002),  we  find  auto-correlated  error  terms  for  all 
specifications.  Multiple  possible  sources  of  auto-correlation  exist.  Most  common  are  the 
model  misspecifications  such  as  nonlinear  impact  of  exogenous  or  omitted  variables. 
Furthermore,  a  time  trend  of  the  dependent  variable  or  nonstationarity  of  the  panel  may 
induce auto-correlation.  We check for  a nonlinear impact of the exogenous variables,  we 
control for the stationarity of the panel, and we detrend the lay-off risk. Unfortunately, these 
                                                           
10 The public sector is excluded because lay-off risk is largely theoretical in this sector. 11 
 
measures could not completely remove the auto-correlation, thus an omitted variable bias is 
still possible. Therefore, we extend our analysis by two regression methods that allow for 
auto-correlated error terms. The first is the mixed models estimation (MME), and the second 
is a fixed-effects linear model with an autoregressive disturbance (OLS-AR).
11 
Finally, we control for the problem common to most empirical models: endogeneity. There 
are two sources of endogeneity in econometrics, correlation between the error term and the 
independent variable and mutual causality between the endogenous and exogenous variables. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to check for the former because the real error terms are not 
known. We address the second issue by a separate, detailed discussion and an instrumented 
variable estimation (two-stage least square, TSLS). 
 
5  Empirical Evidence 
In this section, we provide empirical evidence for our hypothesis that higher wages are the 
result of increased lay-off risks. We present the results for high skilled males and females for 
five industries: construction; manufacturing; wholesale and retail trade; real estate, renting 
and  business  activities;  and  transport,  storage  and  communication.  Table  2  and  Table  3 
present the effect of lay-off risk on wages for these industries for high skilled male and female 
employees in West Germany. The coefficients for the lay-off risk, the corresponding t- or z-
values and the within R-squared are reported. Detailed results of all estimations can be found 
in the appendix.
12 
                                                           
11 An overview of MME is provided by Demidenko (2004). A MME application with auto-correlated error terms 
is given by Hedeker and Gibbons (1996). The fixed-effects OLSAR uses the methods derived by Baltagi and Wu 
(1999). 
12 The detailed tables contain the coefficients of all exogenous variable and their t-values or z-values. 
Furthermore, the numbers of observations are given. 12 
 



















coeff  120381.00***  13694.35***  133256.60***  102785.10***  146532.00** 
t-value  (17.63)  (4.08)  (3.89)  (11.62)  (2.15) 
R
2  0.5202  0.2727  0.3532  0.3031  0.2520 
OLS-RE 
  
coeff  120307.50***  13724.15***  137552.20***  104197.90***  144380.70*** 
z-value  (31.95)  (6.91)  (6.99)  (21.16)  (3.20) 
R
2  0.5195  0.2703  0.3522  0.3027  0.2487 
Log OLS-FE 
coeff  0.15***  0.07***  0.23***  0.19***  0.03 
t-value  (24.10)  (3.91)  (7.76)  (13.93)  (-0.38) 
R
2  0.4239  0.2034  0.2414  0.2043  0.1379 
MME 
coeff  109574.20***  12441.47***  130437.10***  100312.10***  160089.50*** 
z-value  (23.60)  (5.42)  (5.41)  (16.42)  (3.35) 
Log MME  coeff  0.08***  0.06***  0.19***  0.19***  0.17* 
z-value  (15.63)  (4.06)  (4.17)  (11.60)  (1.64) 
OLS-AR 
coeff  578679.50***  55296.61***  528687.60***  336563.7***  581476.50*** 
t-value  (113.61)  (18.63)  (50.36)  (71.61)  (23.79) 
R
2  0.4614  0.3306  0.4000  0.3222  0.3542 
Controls  Age, Professional Status, Firm-size, Firm´s Age Structure, Job Tenure, Year and Quarter Dummy 
Variables 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*).  
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coeff  137199.90***  -948.46  81568.78  115700.90***  46146.74 
t-value  (3.95)  (-0.06)  (0.90)  (4.10)  (0.38) 
R
2  0.2197  0.1263  0.0949  0.1002  0.2015 
OLS-RE 
  
coeff  138745.40***  841.25  80859.47**  114808.10***  40307.83 
z-value  (7.52)  (0.13)  (2.02)  (5.88)  (0.48) 
R
2  0.2192  0.1200  0.0941  0.0996  0.2006 
Log OLS-FE 
coeff  0.20***  -0.02  0.43***  0.24***  0.44*** 
t-value  (5.25)  (-0.12)  (4.17)  (4.47)  (3.55) 
R
2  0.1409  0.1305  0.0760  0.0551  0.1779 
MME 
coeff  130791.8***  4274.88  93961.20  113974.50***  202791.20** 
z-value  (5.57)  (0.44)  (1.59)  (5.98)  (2.31) 
Log MME  coeff  0.12***  0.03  0.18  0.27***  0.34* 
z-value  (4.07)  (0.40)  (1.30)  (4.50)  (1.87) 
OLS-AR 
coeff  576119.70***  52579.76***  435907.20***  262670.50***  440539.4*** 
t-value  (22.96)  (3.84)  (17.07)  (19.10)  (10.56) 
R
2  0.1859  0.0630  0.1430  0.1221  0.3096 
Controls  Age, Professional Status, Firm-size, Firm´s Age Structure, Job Tenure, Year and Quarter Dummy 
Variables 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*).  
We find a positive and significant effect for male high skilled employees in all industries. The 
sign  is  robust  in  every  regression  model.  Even  the  significance  does  not  change  in  the 
regressions that control for auto-correlated error terms (MME, OLS-AR).
13 In contrast to male 
employees, the explanatory power of the empirical model is not that good for female high 
                                                           
13 The MME is specified with an individual random effect and fixed effect for the other exogenous variables. 
Moreover, an auto-correlated error term is added to the model. A likelihood-ratio test suggests that this 
specification is better than a pure FE model. To our knowledge, there are no appropriate quality criterion. 14 
 
skilled employees. The within-R-squared is lower, in general, and for some industries, the risk 
has no effect on the wage (construction industry and transport, storage and communication). 
Similar to the male high skilled employee the coefficient is positive and significant in the 
manufacturing and the wholesale and retail trade industry. The positive relation implies that if 
the risk increases over time, it induces higher wages. As discussed by Murphy and Topel 
(1987), results of such estimations must be interpreted with caution. The coefficient in Table 
2 is the marginal effect of an increase in the lay-off risk on wages. For example, if the average 
industrial specific lay-off risk in the manufacturing industry increases from zero to unity, the 
wage  of  high  skilled  male  employees  increases  by  €  120  381.  This  high  value  is  just  a 
theoretical  effect.  A  more  practical  approach  is  provided  by  the  fixed  effect  OLS, 
respectively, the MME model that uses logarithmic values for the lay-off risk and wage (Log 
OLS, Log MME). Here, the coefficient can easily be interpreted as an elasticity. To maintain 
the same example of the manufacturing industry, a 1% increase of the lay-off risk increases 
the wage approximately 0.15% (Log OLS FE) or 0.08% (Log MME) for the high skilled male 
employees. We find the highest risk premiums in the wholesale and retail trade and the real 
estate,  renting  and  business  activities  industries;  this  result  holds  true  for  both  men  and 
women. 
 
6  Endogeneity and Causality 
Now, we return to the problem of endogeneity. In our situation, mutual causality may induce 
endogeneity; however, wages could also have an impact on the lay-off risk. For example, if 
the  wage  level  increases  exogenously  (e.g.,  collective  agreement)  firms  may  lay-off 
employees. Because of that, the lay-off risk may increase if the wages increase. To address 
the problem of endogeneity, we apply a two-stage least square instrumental variable approach 
(TSLS). Thus, the lay-off risk is instrumented to exclude endogeneity. The causality of the 15 
 
chosen instruments must be clear. In a first step, we use a time-lagged lay-off risk as an 
instrument for the lay-off risk. We do so because it is impossible for current wages to affect 
previous lay-off risks. The time lag induces another problem: auto-correlation. The lay-off 
risk of the last period mainly explains the current lay-off risk. Hence, the length of the lag 
should  exclude  this  auto-correlation  link.  In  our  situation,  a  five-quarter  lag  satisfies  this 
condition. The correlation between the (five-quarter) lagged lay-off risk and the current lay-
off  risk  in  the  different  industries  for  males  and  females  is  between  51%  and  86%.  The 
correlation between wages and lagged lay-off risk is 3% to 15%. In the first stage of the TSLS 
approach,  the  lay-off  risk  is  estimated  by  instruments.  The  F-statistics  of  the  first  stage 
regression for industries and both gender are sufficiently high; thus, the corresponding p-
values are very close to zero. This result suggests that the instruments are usable. Table 4 
summarises  the  results  of  the  TSLS  estimation.
14  The  reported  coefficients  represent  the 
impact of the instrumented variable in the second stage (lay-off risk). The corresponding z-
values are reported in parentheses. The p-value of the first stage F-statistic as well as the 
partial R-square of the instrument and the total R-square of the second stage also are reported. 
   
                                                           
14 More detailed results can be found in the tables in the appendix. 16 
 



















coeff  -360381.40***  40323.59***  89270.26  461116.7***  111517.5 
z-value  (-5.79)  (3.46)  (0.16)  (6.06)  (0.11) 
p-value (F-
statistic)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Par R
2  0.0132  0.0901  0.0041  0.0143  0.0052 
  R
2  0.5067  0.2695  0.3569  0.2931  0.2541 
Female 
  
coeff  -787045.6**  57249.33  610714  246279.4  -301992.3 
z-value  (-2.46)  (1.02)  (0.49)  (1.05)  (-0.35) 
p-value (F-
statistic)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Par R
2  0.0133  0.0973  0.0062  0.0151  0.0224 
  R
2  0.1762  0.1305  0.0896  0.0961  0.1869 
Controls  Age, Professional Status, Firm-size, Firm´s Age Structure, Job Tenure, Year and Quarter 
Dummy Variables 
Instrumented  Lay-off Risk 
Instrument  Lagged lay-off Risk (t-5) 
Source: authors’ calculation. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*).  
This TSLS-regression draws an ambiguous picture. Besides the manufacturing industry, this 
approach confirms the expected positive sign of the coefficients, but, unfortunately, they often 
become insignificant. A plausible explanation for this result may be the small partial R-square 
of the instrument. The lagged lay-off risk on its own explains only a small fraction of the 
current lay-off risk in the first stage regression (1% to 10%).
15 The negative and significant 
sign of the coefficient in the manufacturing industry indicates possible endogeneity in this 
industry. Mutual causality of wages and lay-off risk seems to be plausible in this industry. 
This phenomenon could be due to the strong impact of unions in the manufacturing industry 
                                                           
15 Weak identification tests suggest that our specification is not weakly identified, but the low partial R-square 
implies that the lag instrument is not the best solution. 17 
 
in Germany.
16 Thus, the wages become exogenous for the firms as well as for the individuals, 
and a wage increase may, therefore, induce lay-offs. 
In addition to the weak partial R-square, another point limits the use of lagged variables as 
instruments:  the  rationality  of  individuals.  If  individuals  form  rational  expectations, 
endogeneity cannot be completely excluded by using time-lagged variables. Therefore, we run 
a  TSLS  regression  with  an  alternative  instrument:  sickness  absence  rate.
17  The  sickness 
absence rate shows a high correlation with the lay-off risk in many industries. Moreover, the 
correlation between the wages and the sickness absence rate is between 0% and 8%. Table 5 
shows the correlations for males and females in the five industries. 















Male  0.1735  0.5760  -0.9950  -0.9603  -0.9851 
Female  0.0897  0.5291  -0.9851  -0.9787  -0.9956 
Source: authors’ calculation. 
For three industries (wholesale and retail trade, real estate, renting and business activities and 
transport, storage and communication), the correlation is very strong and shows the expected 
negative sign. In times with a low lay-off risk, the sickness absence rate can be expected to be 
higher  because  of  higher  absenteeism  if  employees  do  not  fear  a  potential  lay-off.  The 
positive signs in the manufacturing and construction industries are not intuitive. Nevertheless, 
the high correlation in the construction industry allows us to use this instrument. Because of 
the  weak  correlation,  the  results  for  the  manufacturing  industry  should  be  viewed  with 
                                                           
16 The union (IG Metall) in the manufacturing industry is one of the biggest in Germany. Furthermore, the tariff 
commitment in this industry is the strongest in the private sector economy. 
17 The sickness absence rate is the share of sick employees to all public health insured employees [Federal 
Ministry of Health (2010)]. The rate is detrended and seasonal adjusted.  18 
 
caution. Table 6 summarises the results of the TSLS with the sickness absence rate as an 
instrument for the lay-off risk. 




















coeff  165223.8***  3626.802  -243534.7**  134090.3***  257369.7* 
z-value  (8.88)  (0.44)  (-2.40)  (4.34)  (1.64) 
p-value (F-
statistic)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Par R
2  0.3930  0.4252  0.8692  0.2486  0.5325 
  R
2  0.0851  0.0840  0.0551  0.0413  0.0657 
Female 
  
coeff  219797.4***  10978.67  -974916.6**  211205.4***  390582.1* 
z-value  (3.42)  (0.40)  (-2.52)  (3.81)  1.88) 
p-value (F-
statistic)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Par R
2  0.9603  0.9767  0.3402  0.8764  0.9909 
  R
2  0.0266  0.1961  0.0238  0.0144  0.0817 
Controls  Age, Professional Status, Firm-size, Firm´s Age Structure, Job Tenure, Year and Quarter 
Dummy Variables 
Instrumented  Lay-off Risk 
Instrument  Sickness Absence Rate 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*).  
Using the sickness absence rate as an instrument for the lay-off risk, the positive sign of the 
coefficient  can  be  confirmed  for  four  industries  (manufacturing,  constructing,  real  estate, 
renting  and  business  activities  and  transport,  storage  and  communication).  However,  the 
coefficient in the construction industry becomes insignificant while for the wholesale and 
retail trade industry the coefficient is significant and negative. The partial R-square of the 19 
 
instrument in the first stage is very high. This result indicates that the instrument is good.
18 
The  p-value  of  the  F-statistic  supports  the  sickness  absence  rate  as  a  valid  instrument. 
Unfortunately, the overall R-square of the second stage decreases. A possible explanation for 
this result is the loss of periods for regression. The sickness absence rate is only available 
since  2003.  The  shorter  the  observation  period,  the  smaller  the  within  variation  is  and, 
therefore, the smaller the R-square. As our set-up is designed to measure the within variation, 
a loss of observation periods is unfortunate. 
A  comparison  of  all  regression  coefficients  between  this  TSLS  model  with  the  original 
models suggest that endogeneity is not a problem for at least three industries (constructing, 
real  estate,  renting  and  business  activities  and  transport,  storage  and  communication).
19 
However, the results for the manufacturing industry must be considered with caution. Here, 
the sickness absence rate appears not to be a perfect instrument because of the very low 
correlation with the lay-off risk. In combination with the lagged TSLS approach, endogeneity 
cannot be excluded for this industry. For the wholesale and retail trade industry, endogeneity 
might be a serious problem. The first TSLS approach leads to insignificant coefficients, and 
the second TSLS approach with a strong and valid instrument leads to negative and high 
significant coefficients. The change of sign of the coefficient in the second TSLS, compared 
to the initial OLS-estimation, points at possible mutual causality between wages and lay-off 
risks for this industry. A possible explanation is, again, an exogenous wage setting, even 
though the all over tariff commitment in this industry is not very high. A different tariff 
commitment  for  different  skill  levels  is  conceivable.  High  skilled  employees  may  have  a 
                                                           
18 Different tests for weak identification suggest strong instruments; our specification is not weakly identified. 
19 Detailed results for the TSLS approach with sickness absence rate can be found in the appendix. We run a 
Hausman-test to compare the OLS and TSLS coefficients for the period between 2003 and 2007. Unfortunately, 
the test statistic becomes most of the times negative. It is not possible to interpret negative test statistics with the 
Hausman test. In cases of positive and, therefore, interpretable test statistics, the Hausman-test indicates 
equivalent coefficients. 20 
 
lower commitment. Unfortunately, however, there are no data or current research on this topic 
available in Germany. 
 
7  Conclusions 
We found evidence that high skilled fulltime employees use the opportunities of lay-off risk 
in the labour market. In three of five main industries (constructing, real estate, renting and 
business  activities  and  transport,  storage  and  communication)  in  West  Germany,  risk 
premiums are present. The check for endogeneity shows that in two industries (manufacturing 
and wholesale and retail trade), mutual causality may be problem. A 1% increase of the lay-
off risk leads to an increase in wages between 0.06% and 0.34%. The impact depends on the 
industry and the gender. For females, we find less significant results compared with males. 
This result may be related to a smaller sample size for high skilled females as their fulltime 
labour market participation is significantly smaller than it is for males [Fitzenberger et al. 
(2004)]. 
Because of the possible mutual causality between lay-off risk and wages, we checked for 
econometric endogeneity. Using TSLS estimation with two different instruments, we back up 
our findings. The instruments are the lagged lay-off risk and the sickness absence rate. For 
three industries, the results of the original estimations are definitely supported by both TSLS 
estimations 
Our  research  findings  suggest  that  more  unsecure  (flexible)  labour  market  conditions  are 
internalised in wages. The employees are aware of higher lay-off risks and, therefore, claim 
higher wages in several industries. In general, employees are interested in achieving the right 
balance between greater job security (lower risk) and higher wages. Employees pay a price for 
secure jobs whereas employers pay a price for unsecure jobs. The existence of a lay-off risk 21 
 
premium probably attracts more high skilled employees to temporary employment. Hence, the 
potential for flexible high skilled jobs could be increased, and therefore, firms may benefit 
from this flexible labour supply. 
Our  study  introduces  several  areas  for  future  research.  First,  endogenous  job  destruction 
should be linked with the examination of lay-off risk premiums. Such a link eases the analysis 
for all skill levels and the potential effects of exogenous wage increases on the lay-off risk. A 
second  research  area  is  connected  with  the  first  one:  investigating  skill-specific  tariff 
commitments. A third research area should focus on intra-industrial job changes. 22 
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Table 7: Male High Skilled in the Manufacturing Industry in West Germany 
 
OLS FE  OLS-RE  Log OLS-FE  MME  Log MME  OLS-AR  TSLS time  TSLS sick 
Age  -1.29  12.19***  0.01***  5.48***  0.00***  20.42***  -1.16  0.09 
(-0.82)  (16.59)  (19.59)  (10.74)  (9.16)  (37.24)  (-0.73)  (0.05) 
Worker  -285.36***  -396.03***  -0.12***  -298.72***  -0.10***  -234.96***  -261.43***  -261.87*** 
(-21.62)  (-5.72)  (-31.60)  (-22.00)  (-26.01)  (-16.32)  (-18.89)  (-15.47) 
Technician  -178.41***  -250.49***  -0.07***  -231.08***  -0.07***  -173.94***  -174.47***  -214.06*** 
(-20.48)  (-5.31)  (-29.30)  (-22.32)  (-24.99)  (-15.93)  (-19.02)  (-17.22) 
Foreman  -6.28  -42.96  -0.01  -60.61***  -0.02***  -21.96***  6.11  52.71*** 
(-0.49)  (-0.76)  (-1.42)  (-4.06)  (-3.63)  (-1.39)  (0.46)  (2.94) 
Small Company  -74.95***  -85.63***  -0.02***  -43.38***  -0.01***  -32.54***  -72.92***  -42.13*** 
(-19.82)  (-5.10)  (-21.76)  (-11.91)  (-12.94)  (-8.57)  (-18.62)  (-8.90) 
Large Company  49.96***  63.25***  0.01***  18.84***  0.01***  17.85***  48.86***  37.42*** 
(18.40)  (6.18)  (18.97)  (6.60)  (7.55)  (5.98)  (17.38)  (10.83) 
Under 20  -229.38***  -291.71  -0.07***  -116.11***  -0.03***  -25.57  -245.33***  -179.43*** 
(-6.82)  (-2.19)  (-6.91)  (-3.80)  (-3.96)  (-0.80)  (-6.94)  (-4.41) 
Over55  -119.35***  -126.19**  -0.04***  -55.94***  -0.02***  -18.94  -123.44***  1.22 
(-8.13)  (-1.89)  (-8.91)  (-3.35)  (-3.67)  (-1.09)  (-8.07)  (0.07) 
Lay-off risk  120381.00***  120307.50***  0.15***  109574.20***  0.08***  578679.50***  -360381.40***  165223.80*** 
(17.63)  (31.95)  (24.10)  (23.60)  (15.63)  (113.61)  (-5.79)  (8.88) 
Job tenure  0.55***  0.65***  0.00***  -1.17***  0.00***  -2.46***  0.52***  -0.39*** 
(5.06)  (1.58)  (5.19)  (-8.10)  (-8.48)  (-16.91)  (4.68)  (-3.31) 
Constant  3698.07***  3147.21***  8.97***  3460.28***  8.69***  828.04***     
(57.39)  (89.69)  (198.78)  (131.86)  (296.17)  (273.76)     
Obs.  173557  173557  173557  173557  173557  166679  167406  110876 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values or z-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all 
estimated with quarter and year dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table     
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Table 8: Female High Skilled in the Manufacturing Industry in West Germany 
  OLS FE  OLS-RE  Log OLS-FE  MME  Log MME  OLS-AR  TSLS time  TSLS sick 
Age  0.46  17.17***  0.01***  8.36***  0.00***  15.20***  -0.35  3.51 
(0.06)  (4.78)  (3.85)  (3.29)  (2.94)  (5.34)  (-0.04)  (0.39) 
Worker  -764.21***  -835.48***  -0.31***  -823.92***  -0.41***  -677.73***  -682.96***  -800.69*** 
(-13.17)  (-2.75)  (-15.78)  (-11.52)  (-17.25)  (-8.87)  (-11.16)  (-10.09) 
Technician  -382.21***  -442.93**  -0.16***  -362.88***  -0.15***  -304.44***  -376.43***   
(-4.71)  (-2.29)  (-5.86)  (-5.32)  (-6.47)  (-4.28)  (-4.16)   
Foreman    612.37***    725.92  0.21      -185.19** 
  (9.17)    (0.93)  (0.84)      (-1.98) 
Small Company  -176.11***  -186.05***  -0.06***  -95.41***  -0.03***  -96.99***  -180.86***  -197.99*** 
(-9.24)  (-3.04)  (-9.12)  (-5.74)  (-5.76)  (-5.50)  (-8.97)  (-7.82) 
Large Company  67.00***  93.47  0.02***  61.72***  0.02***  38.45***  59.10**  15.79 
(4.99)  (2.48)  (3.85)  (4.74)  (4.26)  (2.82)  (4.16)  (0.85) 
Under 20  -46.72  -216.32  0.09  -302.90**  -0.11**  -197.36  -15.33  -17.79 
(-0.27)  (-0.46)  (1.63)  (-2.24)  (-2.46)  (-1.38)  (-0.09)  (-0.08) 
Over55  -141.05*  -173.86  -0.04*  166.65***  0.05*  202.82**  -139.81*  -264.95*** 
(-1.89)  (-0.55)  (-1.69)  (2.01)  (1.91)  (2.36)  (-1.79)  (-2.61) 
Lay-off risk  137199.90***  138745.40***  0.20***  130791.80***  0.12***  576119.70***  -787045.60**  219797.40*** 
(3.95)  (7.52)  (5.25)  (5.57)  (4.07)  (22.96)  (-2.46)  (3.42) 
Job tenure  -1.58***  -1.62  0.00***  -3.28***  0.00***  -4.13***  -1.33**  0.63 
(-2.75)  (-0.80)  (-2.76)  (-4.31)  (-4.74)  (-5.38)  (-2.22)  (0.95) 
Constant  3096.58***  2406.37***  9.08***  2717.21***  8.73***  585.40***     
(10.01)  (16.27)  (33.70)  (21.56)  (49.97)  (39.36)     
Obs.  16634  16634  16634  16634  16634  15896  16010  10527 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values or z-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all 
estimated with quarter and year dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table 
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Table 9: Male High Skilled in the Construction Industry in West Germany 
  OLS FE  OLS-RE  Log OLS-FE  MME  Log MME  OLS-AR  TSLS time  TSLS sick 
Age  3.12  29.59***  0.00***  15.81***  0.00***  44.82***  3.73  1.44 
(0.44)  (9.60)  (3.46)  (6.67)  (6.38)  (20.99)  (0.52)  (0.18) 
Worker  -89.74*  -253.70*  -0.02  -199.48***  -0.05***  -104.17*  -11.59  67.77 
(-1.85)  (-1.66)  (-1.29)  (-3.58)  (-2.89)  (-1.79)  (-0.22)  (1.26) 
Technician  -245.01***  -364.66***  -0.09***  -306.23***  -0.10***  -252.05***  -205.74***  -257.40*** 
(-7.94)  (-3.81)  (-10.02)  (-7.78)  (-8.60)  (-5.89)  (-6.19)  (-5.37) 
Foreman  -62.13*  -151.72  -0.01  -213.83***  -0.07***  -144.81***  -23.60  13.19 
(-1.82)  (-0.95)  (-1.19)  (-5.79)  (-6.53)  (-3.55)  (-0.65)  (0.30) 
Small Company  8.72  -5.75  0.00  -20.54**  -0.01***  -11.72  14.09  23.62* 
(0.91)  (-0.23)  (0.91)  (-2.36)  (-2.60)  (-1.28)  (1.45)  (1.92) 
Large Company  -16.10*  -6.15  -0.01**  25.84***  0.01*  28.96***  -16.61*  17.45 
(-1.69)  (-0.19)  (-2.06)  (2.64)  (1.90)  (2.80)  (-1.69)  (1.44) 
Under 20  -44.66  -81.45  -0.03  -166.10***  -0.05***  -132.25**  -68.71  -189.96** 
(-0.63)  (-0.35)  (-1.27)  (-3.09)  (-3.23)  (-2.34)  (-0.95)  (-2.24) 
Over55  -225.74***  -193.18*  -0.06***  -1.94  0.00  24.14  -195.77***  -59.16 
(-5.99)  (-1.70)  (-5.20)  (-0.05)  (0.01)  (0.60)  (-5.04)  (-1.30) 
Lay-off risk  13694.35***  13724.15***  0.07***  12441.47***  0.06***  55296.61***  40323.59***  3626.80 
(4.08)  (6.91)  (3.91)  (5.42)  (4.06)  (18.63)  (3.46)  (0.44) 
Job tenure  1.97***  1.95  0.00***  1.83***  0.00**  0.33  1.60***  1.31*** 
(4.34)  (1.21)  (4.10)  (3.05)  (2.04)  (0.55)  (3.44)  (2.58) 
Constant  3483.40***  2416.64***  8.39***  2918.38***  8.25***  783.99***   
(12.65)  (18.36)  (77.35)  (28.59)  (132.04)  (65.37)   
Obs.  12000  12000  12000  12000  12000  11391  11441  7365 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values or z-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all 
estimated with quarter and year dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table 
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Table 10: Female High Skilled in the Construction Industry in West Germany 
  OLS FE  OLS-RE  Log OLS-FE  MME  Log MME  OLS-AR  TSLS time  TSLS sick 
Age  -11.98  -9.13  0.00  -22.19**  -0.01***  -21.82**  -23.33  -16.09 
(-0.34)  (-0.52)  (-0.51)  (-2.47)  (-2.84)  (-2.15)  (-0.66)  (-0.42) 
Worker         
       
Technician  -85.04  -285.15  -0.06  -38.82  -0.02  2.31  -54.86   
(-0.32)  (-1.08)  (-0.53)  (-0.23)  (-0.33)  (0.01)  (-0.15)   
Foreman  419.00**  294.39*  0.15**  348.85  0.21**  464.70*  435.21**   
(2.47)  (2.39)  (1.97)  (1.49)  (2.13)  (1.77)  (2.39)   
Small Company  226.84***  139.76  0.08***  5.88  0.00  27.53  230.16***  215.34*** 
(4.50)  (1.14)  (3.42)  (0.16)  (-0.18)  (0.69)  (4.45)  (2.94) 
Large Company  -494.12***  -286.28  -0.19***  -34.24  -0.01  -114.97**  -547.17***  -707.19*** 
(-5.98)  (-1.09)  (-4.93)  (-0.65)  (-0.37)  (-2.09)  (-6.48)  (-7.68) 
Under 20  457.14**  393.15  0.26***  -34.27  -0.01  -13.64  393.44**  103.63 
(2.34)  (1.14)  (2.84)  (-0.23)  (-0.09)  (-0.09)  (1.99)  (0.36) 
Over 55  -161.11  -136.51  -0.09*  112.65  0.03  52.37  -203.62  -23.02 
(-1.30)  (-0.70)  (-1.66)  (1.03)  (0.78)  (0.47)  (-1.61)  (-0.17) 
Lay-off risk  -948.46  841.25  -0.02  4274.88  0.03  52579.76***  57249.33  10978.67 
(-0.06)  (0.13)  (-0.12)  (0.44)  (0.40)  (3.84)  (1.01)  (0.40) 
Job tenure  -10.75***  -11.29  0.00***  -5.89  0.00  -8.80**  -11.12***  -14.92*** 
(-3.55)  (-1.58)  (-3.18)  (-1.54)  (-1.39)  (-2.17)  (-3.58)  (-3.80) 
Constant  3149.82**  3060.37***  7.90***  3442.37***  8.34***  1856.35***     
(2.38)  (4.62)  (9.26)  (8.85)  (23.04)  (46.06)     
Obs.  1459  1459  1459  1459  1459  1382  1396  949 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values or z-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all 
estimated with quarter and year dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table 
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Table 11: Male High Skilled in the Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry in West Germany 
  OLS FE  OLS-RE  Log OLS-FE  MME  Log MME  OLS-AR  TSLS time  TSLS sick 
Age  3.26  18.21***  0.00*  6.31***  0.00***  -0.83  4.00  2.35 
(0.84)  (8.91)  (1.65)  (4.51)  (3.67)  (-0.50)  (1.04)  (0.58) 
Worker  -142.81***  -278.50**  -0.07***  -306.02***  -0.11***  -263.22***  -103.92***  -108.89*** 
(-3.73)  (-2.55)  (-5.72)  (-7.68)  (-8.99)  (-6.15)  (-2.58)  (-2.74) 
Technician  -68.54***  -138.04  -0.05***  -224.16***  -0.09***  -168.65**  -49.23**  -36.77 
(-3.34)  (-1.34)  (-8.40)  (-8.06)  (-10.16)  (-5.91)  (-2.37)  (-1.40) 
Foreman  -116.43***  -178.56  -0.05***  -242.60***  -0.08***  -233.75***  -133.31***  -146.74*** 
(-3.78)  (-1.30)  (-4.97)  (-7.24)  (-7.96)  (-6.65)  (-4.25)  (-4.16) 
Small Company  -57.81***  -71.54***  -0.01***  -40.18***  -0.01***  -30.03**  -54.68***  -59.16*** 
(-8.90)  (-3.47)  (-7.10)  (-6.49)  (-6.12)  (-4.63)  (-8.23)  (-7.23) 
Large Company  21.75***  32.70  0.01***  29.24***  0.01***  22.42***  21.75***  12.02 
(3.20)  (1.59)  (3.53)  (4.28)  (3.40)  (3.15)  (3.16)  (1.47) 
Under 20  78.53*  8.21  0.00  8.39  0.00  45.07  83.70*  -14.42 
(1.79)  (0.06)  (-0.02)  (0.22)  (-0.39)  (1.16)  (1.88)  (-0.27) 
Over 55  -145.37***  -157.33*  -0.04***  -7.93  0.00  -13.04  -129.29***  -45.31* 
(-6.49)  (-1.76)  (-5.97)  (-0.34)  (-0.37)  (-0.55)  (-5.70)  (-1.76) 
Lay-off risk  133256.60***  137552.20***  0.23***  130437.10***  0.19***  528687.60***  89270.26  -243534.70** 
(3.89)  (6.99)  (7.76)  (5.41)  (4.17)  (50.36)  (0.16)  (-2.40) 
Job tenure  1.07***  0.99  0.00*  0.83*  0.00  0.63  1.04***  0.53 
(3.27)  (0.77)  (1.82)  (1.82)  (0.94)  (1.37)  (3.15)  (1.50) 
Constant  2895.40***  2278.16***  9.35***  2754.25***  9.12***  388.85***   
(11.14)  (15.59)  (48.67)  (17.08)  (39.34)  (54.17)   
Obs  32017  32017  32017  32017  32017  30171  30663  19705 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values or z-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all 
estimated with quarter and year dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table    
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Table 12: Female High Skilled in the Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry in West Germany 
  OLS FE  OLS-RE  Log OLS-FE  MME  Log MME  OLS-AR  TSLS time  TSLS sick 
Age  -8.10  6.91  0.00  -0.13  0.00  -8.74**  -9.76  -8.36 
(-0.75)  (1.39)  (-0.16)  (-0.04)  (-0.71)  (-2.14)  (-0.89)  (-0.83) 
Worker  167.89**  104.26  0.03  -68.49  -0.08**  24.00  188.41***  -2.16 
(2.43)  (0.53)  (0.99)  (-0.77)  (-2.31)  (0.27)  (2.62)  (-0.03) 
Technician  657.53***  605.04  0.35***  180.47***  0.09***  221.43***  640.99***  -844.12*** 
(11.35)  (1.12)  (15.84)  (2.74)  (3.63)  (3.21)  (10.64)  (-6.27) 
Foreman  487.65***  471.44***  0.21***  48.71  0.01  111.01  513.07***  547.28*** 
(6.18)  (3.67)  (6.86)  (0.59)  (0.41)  (1.31)  (6.36)  (4.41) 
Small Company  -43.94**  -67.96  -0.02**  -31.73**  -0.01**  -16.00  -49.84***  -1.84 
(-2.41)  (-1.41)  (-2.47)  (-2.28)  (-2.18)  (-1.11)  (-2.65)  (-0.09) 
Large Company  43.73**  58.97  0.02***  36.95**  0.01*  31.86*  53.55***  27.30 
(2.42)  (1.13)  (3.14)  (2.19)  (1.95)  (1.81)  (2.87)  (1.42) 
Under 20  -182.50**  -234.74  -0.06**  -139.25**  -0.06**  -99.51  -134.27*  -199.14** 
(-2.33)  (-1.11)  (-2.14)  (-2.34)  (-2.48)  (-1.61)  (-1.66)  (-2.19) 
Over 55  -74.94*  -93.78  0.01  -3.05  0.00  5.95  -67.11  -46.69 
(-1.65)  (-0.51)  (0.32)  (-0.07)  (0.18)  (0.12)  (-1.43)  (-1.03) 
Lay-off risk  81568.78  80859.47**  0.43***  93961.20  0.18  435907.20***  610714.00  -974916.60** 
(0.90)  (2.02)  (4.17)  (1.59)  (1.30)  (17.07)  (0.49)  (-2.52) 
Job tenure  -4.33***  -4.54  0.00***  -2.53**  0.00***  -3.58***  -4.94***  -6.26*** 
(-5.55)  (-1.41)  (-7.28)  (-2.41)  (-2.62)  (-3.33)  (-6.22)  (-7.79) 
Constant  2862.15  2357.51***  10.15***  2507.58***  8.91***  501.03***   
(4.19)  (7.60)  (15.64)  (6.38)  (12.80)  (31.45)   
Obs.  9588  9588  9588  9588  9588  9099  9172  6097 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values or z-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all 
estimated with quarter and year dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table 
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Table 13: Male High Skilled in the Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities Industry in West Germany 
  OLS FE  OLS-RE  Log OLS-FE  MME  Log MME  TSLS time  TSLS time  TSLS sick 
Age  7.98***  18.29***  0.00***  8.02***  0.00***  7.51  7.51  4.04 
(2.90)  (10.79)  (5.33)  (8.89)  (8.25)  (2.73)  (2.73)  (1.48) 
Worker  -488.31***  -602.27***  -0.19***  -444.07***  -0.20***  -484.19***  -484.19***  -350.90*** 
(-17.54)  (-4.38)  (-21.78)  (-15.37)  (-22.07)  (-16.67)  (-16.67)  (-11.80) 
Technician  -275.73***  -342.35***  -0.10***  -171.82***  -0.07***  -269.20***  -269.20***  -40.70* 
(-12.66)  (-3.22)  (-15.03)  (-6.84)  (-8.25)  (-11.75)  (-11.75)  (-1.73) 
Foreman  -162.48***  -179.44  -0.04***  -199.03***  -0.06***  -158.23***  -158.23***  -74.09** 
(-4.79)  (-1.48)  (-3.62)  (-5.32)  (-4.78)  (-4.56)  (-4.56)  (-2.02) 
Small Company  -46.10***  -54.45***  -0.01***  -42.23***  -0.01***  -46.16***  -46.16***  -49.42*** 
(-11.58)  (-4.04)  (-11.61)  (-11.32)  (-10.91)  (-11.32)  (-11.32)  (-10.57) 
Large Company  17.48***  26.58**  0.01***  18.64***  0.01***  12.83***  12.83***  21.68*** 
(4.25)  (2.18)  (4.12)  (4.46)  (5.34)  (3.06)  (3.06)  (4.48) 
Under 20  -38.57  -81.50  -0.01  -48.03  -0.01  -18.46  -18.46  10.35 
(-0.99)  (-0.61)  (-0.80)  (-1.52)  (-1.37)  (-0.46)  (-0.46)  (0.24) 
Over 55  -151.91***  -151.11***  -0.04***  -16.91  -0.01  -138.92***  -138.92***  -76.98*** 
(-9.32)  (-3.01)  (-7.04)  (-0.97)  (-1.27)  (-8.39)  (-8.39)  (-4.16) 
Lay-off risk  102785.10***  104197.90***  0.19***  100312.10***  0.19***  461116.70***  461116.70***  134090.30*** 
(11.62)  (21.16)  (13.93)  (16.42)  (11.60)  (6.06)  (6.06)  (4.34) 
Job tenure  -2.27***  -2.18***  0.00***  -2.35***  0.00***  -2.47***  -2.47***  -1.93*** 
(-11.89)  (-3.09)  (-11.32)  (-9.35)  (-8.93)  (-12.80)  (-12.80)  (-9.81) 
Constant  2769.01***  2318.60***  9.03***  2710.78***  9.03***     
(22.40)  (30.36)  (97.53)  (45.29)  (114.77)     
Obs.  92197  92197  92197  92197  92197  88458  88458  58930 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values or z-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all 
estimated with quarter and year dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table 
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Table 14: Female High Skilled in the Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities Industry in West Germany 
  OLS FE  OLS-RE  Log OLS-FE  MME  Log MME  TSLS time  TSLS sick  OLS-AR 
Age  -4.69  16.32***  0.00  5.71**  0.00  -5.26  3.84  -2.88 
(-0.53)  (3.98)  (-0.87)  (2.03)  (1.54)  (-0.60)  (0.42)  (-0.89) 
Worker  -119.70**  -189.25  -0.07***  -338.19***  -0.19***  -108.74*  -69.40  -290.12*** 
(-1.98)  (-1.29)  (-2.96)  (-6.89)  (-10.41)  (-1.79)  (-1.17)  (-5.73) 
Technician  -88.48  -118.11  -0.01  25.30  0.02  -188.75**  53.39  -28.17 
(-1.06)  (-1.18)  (-0.26)  (0.32)  (0.57)  (-2.08)  (0.62)  (-0.35) 
Foreman  -208.07***  -20.05  0.05     
(-4.00)  (-0.02)  (0.15)     
Small Company  -33.48***  -46.85  -0.01***  -46.80***  -0.02***  19:86  -55.59***  -37.20*** 
(-2.64)  (-0.98)  (-2.84)  (-4.25)  (-4.29)  (-1.53)  (-3.51)  (-3.22) 
Large Company  43.50***  56.97  0.02***  54.12***  0.02***  29.98**  51.19***  39.37*** 
(3.50)  (1.50)  (3.87)  (4.67)  (4.95)  (2.37)  (3.38)  (3.24) 
Under 20  -171.23*  -204.40  -0.07*  -35.84  -0.02  -160.45*  -181.96  -29.73 
(-1.89)  (-0.67)  (-1.91)  (-0.51)  (-0.79)  (-1.71)  (-1.48)  (-0.40) 
Over 55  -88.11*  -83.22  -0.01  -74.32  -0.02  -109.74**  -76.57  -74.01 
(-1.75)  (-0.74)  (-0.46)  (-1.49)  (-0.92)  (-2.16)  (-1.32)  (-1.44) 
Lay-off risk  115700.90***  114808.10***  0.24***  113974.50***  0.27***  246279.40  211205.40***  262670.50*** 
(4.10)  (5.88)  (4.47)  (5.98)  (4.50)  (1.05)  (3.81)  (19.10) 
Job tenure  0.12  0.34  0.00  -1.84**  0.00  -0.82  0.91  -2.78*** 
(0.21)  (0.16)  (0.48)  (-2.47)  (-0.69)  (-1.38)  (1.43)  (-3.63) 
Constant  2477.58***  1710.90***  9.27***  2083.09***  9.25***    1044.91*** 
(6.60)  (8.18)  (26.24)  (11.39)  (31.96)    (88.70) 
Obs.  16878  16878  16878  16878  16878  16094  10699  15998 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values or z-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all 
estimated with quarter and year dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table 
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Table 15: Male High Skilled in the Transport, Storage and Communication Industry in West Germany 
  OLS FE  OLS-RE  Log OLS-FE  MME  Log MME  TSLS time  TSLS sick  OLS-AR 
Age  -0.49  12.47***  0.00  8.32**  0.00**  0.01  -3.50  0.09 
(-0.05)  (2.57)  (-0.39)  (2.51)  (2.26)  (0.00)  (-0.33)  (0.02) 
Worker  -66.30  -337.17**  -0.05**  -253.38***  -0.11***  -59.85  -136.94*  -129.40** 
(-1.13)  (-2.26)  (-2.48)  (-4.38)  (-5.54)  (-0.98)  (-1.79)  (-2.05) 
Technician  64.82  -124.25  0.01  -311.67***  -0.14***  95.89*  -140.10**  -308.37*** 
(1.24)  (-0.82)  (0.27)  (-5.78)  (-7.67)  (1.76)  (-2.23)  (-5.62) 
Foreman  -789.97***  -744.49  -0.20     
(-11.75)  (-0.94)  (-0.77)     
Small Company  -19.16  -40.11  0.00  -32.88**  -0.01*  -17.10  17.05  -17.62 
(-1.30)  (-0.97)  (0.33)  (-2.36)  (-1.94)  (-1.13)  (0.91)  (-1.21) 
Large Company  2.86  16.48  0.01  24.41  0.01*  5.74  41.75**  12.84 
(0.20)  (0.44)  (1.23)  (1.64)  (1.82)  (0.38)  (2.43)  (0.82) 
Under 20  72.45  -41.79  -0.04  -167.95  -0.07*  73.95  -571.70***  -134.37 
(0.50)  (-0.10)  (-0.80)  (-1.36)  (-1.65)  (0.49)  (-2.79)  (-1.02) 
Over 55  470.40***  378.58  0.24***  246.08***  0.11***  523.28***  658.44***  362.67*** 
(6.18)  (0.77)  (8.83)  (3.38)  (4.29)  (6.61)  (7.06)  (4.75) 
Lay-off risk  146532.00**  144380.70***  0.03  160089.50***  0.17*  111517.50  257369.70*  581476.50*** 
(2.15)  (3.20)  (0.38)  (3.35)  (1.64)  (0.11)  (1.64)  (23.79) 
Job tenure  4.05***  3.93  0.00***  2.69**  0.00***  4.31***  6.40***  3.18*** 
(5.23)  (0.85)  (8.10)  (2.52)  (3.74)  (5.42)  (6.71)  (2.86) 
Constant  2850.59***  2433.39***  8.36***  2474.33***  8.96***    -76.81*** 
(5.06)  (7.05)  (17.59)  (7.64)  (17.37)    (-4.42) 
Obs.  7573  7573  7573  7573  7573  7282  5071  7110 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values or z-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all 
estimated with quarter and year dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table 
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Table 16: Female High Skilled in the Transport, Storage and Communication Industry in West Germany 
  OLS FE  OLS-RE  Log OLS-FE  MME  Log MME  TSLS time  TSLS sick  OLS-AR 
Age  2.61  25.41**  0.01  11.47*  0.00*  2.75  -4.32  10.08 
(0.15)  (2.48)  (0.91)  (1.89)  (1.66)  (0.16)  (-0.23)  (1.42) 
Worker       
     
Technician  -304.08***  -285.27***  -0.23***  -281.24*  -0.18***  -294.95**    -276.87* 
(-2.56)  (-2.80)  (-5.34)  (-1.89)  (-3.62)  (-2.24)    (-1.70) 
Foreman       
     
Small Company  64.67**  45.69  0.02*  25.13  0.01  61.47**  91.18**  39.87 
(2.15)  (0.59)  (1.93)  (0.95)  (1.52)  (1.97)  (2.41)  (1.42) 
Large Company  40.90  56.66  0.02**  55.46**  0.02**  45.23  99.75***  42.57 
(1.36)  (0.74)  (2.16)  (2.11)  (2.27)  (1.46)  (3.01)  (1.54) 
Under 20  -938.31***  -968.50  -0.41***  -208.81  -0.14*  -1035.76***  -771.35**  -314.61 
(-3.49)  (-1.17)  (-4.23)  (-0.96)  (-1.93)  (-3.79)  (-2.25)  (-1.39) 
Over 55  -1138.04***  -1127.73  -0.38***  -178.06  -0.08  -1057.55***  -624.57***  -138.43 
(-7.71)  (-1.54)  (-7.09)  (-1.23)  (-1.58)  (-7.04)  (-3.47)  (-0.92) 
Lay-off risk  46146.74  40307.83  0.44***  202791.20**  0.34*  -301992.30  390582.10*  440539.40*** 
(0.38)  (0.48)  (3.55)  (2.31)  (1.87)  (-0.35)  (1.88)  (10.56) 
Job tenure  -6.41***  -6.77  0.00***  -13.70***  -0.01***  -6.14***  -10.07***  -12.39*** 
(-4.85)  (-1.27)  (-7.90)  (-8.22)  (-10.11)  (-4.60)  (-6.93)  (-7.47) 
Constant  2829.69***  2134.64***  10.09***  1508.85***  9.62***    -86.43*** 
(2.97)  (3.08)  (12.22)  (2.59)  (10.33)    (-3.17) 
Obs.   2413  2413  2413  2413  2413  2315  1567  2276 
Source: authors’ calculations. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). T-values or z-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The models were all 
estimated with quarter and year dummy variables. In order to ensure a clear representation these variables were omitted from the table 
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